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I. INTRODUCTION  
The nation is currently divided regarding whether, and to what extent, 
judicial process is deemed necessary for a mortgage loan holder to foreclose on 
property secured by a defaulted mortgage loan. Foreclosure actions are 
creatures of state law, and the states have produced many responses to this issue 
along a spectrum of differing policy commitments. 
In roughly half of the states, a foreclosure action is a perfunctory 
administrative proceeding without any judicial element. If a borrower desires 
judicial process, the borrower must file a lawsuit against the mortgage holder or 
servicer to stop the non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. If a borrower does not 
file a lawsuit to stop the foreclosure proceeding, the property could be sold at 
auction in as little as six weeks. 
By contrast, in so-called judicial foreclosure states, the mortgage holder 
must file a lawsuit to foreclose on the mortgaged property. At the same time, 
however, such “judicial” foreclosures contain an increasing number of 
administrative components, particularly mandatory mediation programs, which 
creates a situation in which a judicial foreclosure lasts for years, even when the 
borrower does not respond to the complaint.1  
Even in judicial states, the courts are ambivalent when it comes to 
determining the relative mix of judicial process and administrative procedure 
necessary in a foreclosure proceeding. By varying degrees, courts in judicial 
states view foreclosure actions as ordinary lawsuits or as unique proceedings 
that contain both judicial and administrative elements. This type of ambivalence 
in judicial foreclosures is becoming more pronounced the more foreclosures are 
filed and the more the judicial foreclosure process is scrutinized, leading to 
disagreement among courts and attorneys regarding how a foreclosure action 
should proceed. 
                                                                                                                       
 * J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Ph.D., The Ohio State 
University.  
 1 In judicial states such as New York and Florida, the average foreclosure action lasts 
between two and three years. See Les Christie, Foreclosure Free Ride: 3 Years, No 
Payments, CNNMONEY (Jan. 1, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/28/ 
real_estate/foreclosure/index.htm. Contested foreclosures and/or those involving mandatory 
mediation programs could last considerably longer before resolution.  
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II. EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AMBIVALENCE 
Two separate splits have emerged in authority among the intermediate 
appellate courts in Ohio—a prominent judicial foreclosure state. In one such 
split, the appellate courts are divided regarding whether a mortgage assignment 
must be executed in favor of the foreclosure plaintiff before the foreclosure 
action is filed, or simply whether the mortgage assignment must be executed 
before the foreclosure plaintiff moves for judgment.2 The courts requiring the 
assignment of mortgage before judgment tend to view a foreclosure action as an 
ordinary lawsuit under which the Ohio equivalent of Federal Rule 17(a) 
applies.3 This rule permits assignees to sue in their own names where it is 
sufficient for the plaintiff simply to allege that it is entitled to enforce the 
promissory note and accompanying mortgage deed before it moves for default 
or summary judgment.4 
On the other hand, the Ohio appellate courts that require a mortgage 
assignment to be executed in favor of the mortgagee before the complaint is 
filed tend to view the foreclosure action as more of an administrative, even 
inquisitional process. Under this approach, the mortgagee must produce 
documentation sufficient to illustrate to the court that the action has been 
brought by the actual party entitled to enforce the mortgage loan, even before 
the borrower has had an opportunity to respond to the complaint. In order to 
advance the foreclosure action to judgment and sale, such sufficient 
documentation must be produced, or the case will be dismissed, albeit without 
prejudice.5 
Additionally, a recent split has emerged regarding the effect of a Rule 41 
voluntary dismissal on a foreclosure judgment and unconfirmed foreclosure 
sale. An Ohio intermediate appellate court, the state’s Second District Court of 
Appeals, viewed a foreclosure action more as an ordinary lawsuit than a hybrid 
proceeding when it held that a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal had no effect on the 
existing judgment, which could only be vacated upon a meritorious Rule 60 
motion.6 
By contrast, a different appellate court nevertheless held that a Rule 41 
voluntary dismissal could be filed after a judgment and a foreclosure sale, 
dissolving the action and vacating the judgment and sale with a simple notice 
                                                                                                                       
 2 See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 802–03 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2011). This case is currently a certified conflict case before the Ohio Supreme 
Court. 954 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 2011) (table). 
 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a); OHIO CIV. R. 17(a). 
 4 See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Marcino, 908 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2009). 
 5 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722, 724, 727 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2008).  
 6 Coates v. Navarro, Nos. 86-CA-11 and 86-CA-18, 1987 WL 8490, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 27, 1987). 
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filing and without any motion or approval by the court or the opposing parties.7 
In this respect, the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals has viewed the 
foreclosure sale process as an integral part of a foreclosure action, rather than 
merely as a form of execution upon a judgment obtained against the borrower.8 
Consistent with this holding, the same appellate court recently revealed 
another instance of the ambivalence between administrative and judicial 
elements in the judicial foreclosure process, explaining that: 
Although appellants are correct in stating that an order of foreclosure is a 
final and appealable order, and that at least one Ohio appellate court has held 
that Civ.R. 60(B), and not Civ.R. 41(A), provides the only mechanism to 
change such an order, this court has taken the position that a foreclosure action, 
with its two-part process, is a unique process under the law and that prior to 
completion of both parts of that process—that is, completion of both the order 
of foreclosure and the order confirming the sheriff’s sale—an entire 
foreclosure action, including any previously-issued order of foreclosure, can be 
dissolved with the filing of a Civ.R. 41(A) voluntary dismissal.9 
Both cases contain incongruities that further underscore this ambivalence in 
judicial foreclosures. In Coates v. Navarro, an Ohio appellate court held that 
only a meritorious motion for relief from judgment under the state’s Rule 60(B) 
could dissolve the judgment.10 However, it is strange, to say the least, that the 
party who received a favorable judgment would move to vacate, or receive 
relief from, the same judgment. This is particularly so because one of the 
necessary elements in moving to vacate a judgment under Ohio Rule 60(B) is to 
establish a meritorious defense or claim to assert if relief is granted, implying 
that justice may be denied if the movant is denied an opportunity to assert such 
a meritorious claim or defense.11 However, if a party is moving to vacate its 
own judgment, it is not doing so to litigate any claims or defenses which have 
already been resolved in its favor. Instead, such a party is moving to vacate the 
judgment in order to dismiss the action. 
                                                                                                                       
 7 Compare OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1) (permitting a plaintiff to dismiss all claims either 
by “filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless a 
counterclaim” is pending, or by “filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (notice of voluntary dismissal 
must be filed “before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary 
judgment” or by party stipulation). 
 8 See Countrywide Home Loans Servicing v. Nichpor, No. WD-11-047, 2012 WL 
929023, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2012); N. Ohio Inv. Co. v. Yarger, No. WD-06-025, 
2006 WL 2587454, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2006). 
 9 Countrywide, 2012 WL 929023, at *2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 10 Coates, 1987 WL 8490, at *5. 
 11 See GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Indus., Inc., 351 N.E.2d 113, 113 (Ohio 
1976). 
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By contrast, as in Countrywide Home Loans Servicing v. Nichpor and 
Northern Ohio Investment Co. v. Yarger,12 some Ohio appellate courts, in 
viewing the foreclosure proceeding as a hybrid proceeding involving both 
administrative and judicial elements, appear to have no answer for some 
procedural issues created by this approach.  If a judgment may be vacated when 
the foreclosure plaintiff files a voluntary notice of dismissal under Rule 41, it is 
not clear what effect such a filing would have on the opposing party’s appellate 
rights. Additionally, if a third party purchases the property at a sheriff’s sale, 
and the mortgagee suffers prejudice as a result of the third party’s purchase,13 
then a mortgagee could simply file a voluntary dismissal notice to dissolve the 
effects of the sale before the sale is final and a new deed is issued in favor of the 
third party. In non-foreclosure lawsuits, judgments are not so fungible. 
III. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AMBIVALENCE CURRENTLY 
Judicial foreclosure ambivalence has become more recognizable and 
pronounced in the wake of the housing crisis. The most obvious contributing 
factor is the current glut of foreclosure cases that has accumulated over the past 
several years and that will likely remain high for many years to come. Another 
significant factor causing judicial ambivalence is the documentation issues and 
scandals involving the mortgage servicing industry, such as the “robo-signing” 
scandal in which affiants employed by mortgage servicers may not have 
executed affidavits with the requisite personal knowledge, despite attestations to 
the contrary.14 These factors have induced key players in judicial foreclosures—
the courts, the litigators, and the parties—to transform a traditionally simplistic, 
almost mechanical process into one involving ever-increasing complexity and 
considerable disagreement on key issues. 
As to the administrative components of a judicial foreclosure action, two 
significant issues have emerged. One issue is the substantial role mandatory 
mediation programs have played in the foreclosure process. Mandatory 
mediation programs have greatly increased the length of time it takes to resolve 
foreclosure disputes. Not surprisingly, as court dockets have become clogged 
with foreclosures, and tax revenues have declined, mediation resources have 
                                                                                                                       
 12 Nichpor, 2012 WL 929023; Yarger, 2006 WL 2587454. 
 13 A mortgagee’s failure to outbid a third party could create liability for the mortgagee 
in certain ways. For one, the mortgagee may be required to bid the entire debt amount, 
regardless of the value of the property, in order to recover mortgage insurance proceeds that 
are tied to the price paid at a sheriff’s sale. This is particularly the case for loans insured by 
the federal government through the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Additionally, if the mortgagee fails to enter a bid, and the property sells for a price far below 
the amount for which the mortgagee could hope to liquidate the property, the mortgagee will 
suffer a loss. 
 14 Cf. Ohio v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743–44 (N.D. Ohio 2011) 
(alleging GMAC’s practice of filing false affidavits is fraud in violation of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practice Act). 
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become strained.15 In Cook County, Illinois, a borrower who requests mediation 
once a foreclosure action is filed may not attend the first of several mediation 
conferences for nearly eight months.16 From that point, it is not uncommon for a 
case to be in mediation for over a year, during which time the foreclosure action 
is stayed. 
This result is particularly vexing given that the longer a mortgage loan 
remains in default, the more difficult it is for the mortgagor to bring the loan 
current. The reason for this problem is not simply the accumulation of interest 
on the loan, but also the fact that the mortgage servicer ordinarily advances the 
costs for property taxes, hazard insurance, and mortgage insurance, including 
attorney fees and court costs—all of which are assessed to the borrower under 
the mortgage deed as a consequence of the borrower’s default.17 Furthermore, 
mortgage loan servicers, who are tasked with determining whether a borrower 
receives a loan modification, are typically legally bound not to waive principal 
or interest on a loan—a reality that keeps loan balances exceedingly high 
relative to the values of the properties, thereby increasing the risk of a 
borrower’s strategic default. The extreme delays occasioned by mandatory 
mediation also create additional risks for “charged off” properties18 and 
therefore make pursuing a foreclosure action financially unappealing to a 
mortgagee. Of course, the risk of abandoned properties increases for the same 
reasons. 
Additionally, as the result of the “robo-signing” scandal, some courts have 
become skeptical of mortgagees and the documents filed with the court.19 These 
                                                                                                                       
 15 See Alon Cohen, New Source of Mortgage Mediation Funds: Seeing Success, States 
Are Adding and Expanding Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Programs—Something the 
State AG Settlement Should Support, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/05/mortgage_mediation.html. 
 16 See Anna C. Kahriman, Cook County’s Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program: 
One Year Later,  POSTESTIVO & ASSOCIATES, P.C. (July 27, 2011), http://www.potestivolaw. 
com/index.php?area=Articles&article_id=228. 
 17 Uniform covenants in the mortgage forms issued by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
permit a lender to “do and pay” for all “reasonable or appropriate” expenses arising out of a 
borrower’s default, including property taxes, hazard insurance premiums, and property 
preservation costs that ultimately become a part of the borrower’s balance due and owing. 
See, e.g., Security Instruments: First Lien Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (follow “Form 3036: Ohio 
Mortgage” hyperlink; then view § 9). 
 18 “Charged off” properties are properties that have declined in value to such an extent 
that it no longer becomes financially worthwhile for mortgagees to bear the costs of pursuing 
foreclosure when the property will be liquidated at such a low price on a far-off date in the 
future.  
 19  See Wash. Mut. Bank v. Phillip, No. 16359/08, 2010 WL 4813782, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 29, 2010) (quoting Chief Judge Lippman, who said “[w]e cannot allow the courts in 
New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed 
process, especially when that process involves basic human needs—such as a family 
home—during this period of economic crisis.”). 
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courts now demand compliance with increasing administrative requirements 
before a foreclosure action can be filed or before judgment can be granted in 
favor of the mortgagee. For instance, foreclosure actions in New York can only 
be permissibly filed with an affidavit from the mortgagee’s counsel verifying 
both that the attorney communicated with the mortgagee’s representative who 
reviewed the mortgage documents for accuracy, and that the attorney 
determined the documents contained no false statements of law.20 New Jersey 
and a few Ohio counties have enacted similar requirements.21 
In these instances, the courts are not viewing the foreclosure process as an 
ordinary lawsuit involving an adversarial process. Instead, these courts have 
transformed an ordinary judicial process into an inquisitional proceeding in 
which the court is inquiring into the attorney–client relationship between the 
mortgagee and its counsel, and is requiring that the mortgagee’s attorney 
effectively become a witness in the case. Such a requirement would be unheard 
of in the context of other civil lawsuits. 
Besides additional administrative requirements, judicial foreclosures have 
seen changes to the actual judicial process. Most prominent among these 
changes are pre-trial litigation issues at the pleading and summary judgment 
stages. Many of these issues concern what remains the most contested factual 
issue in foreclosures, in either the judicial or non-judicial context: the 
foreclosing party’s standing or status as the real party in interest to initiate a 
foreclosure action. This single issue creates problems at every stage of litigation 
from pleading to appeal. Additionally, and in the wake of the recent “robo-
signing” scandal, the judgment stage, with its dependence on affidavits from 
mortgage loan holders, has become a particularly notable area for emerging 
issues.22 Not surprisingly, the two issues—standing and suspect affidavits—
frequently arise at the same time. 
As a matter of substantive law, few would deny that an originating 
mortgage lender has the right to assign or transfer the mortgage loan to another 
                                                                                                                       
 20 See Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, New York Courts First in 
Country to Institute Filing Requirement to Preserve Integrity of Foreclosure Process (Oct. 
20, 2010), available at www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2010_12.shtml. 
 21 See Press Release, Notice to the Bar, Emergent Amendments to Rules 1:5-6, 4:64-1 
and 4:64-2, Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts (Dec. 20, 2010) (on file with the 
author); STEPHEN R. BUCHENROTH, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OHIO COURTS REACT TO 
ROBO-SIGNERS BY PLACING BURDEN UPON LAWYERS (June 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte_ereport/2011/ 
2011_aba_rpte_ereport_03_rp_buchenroth.authcheckdam.pdf (reacting to the two largest 
Ohio counties’ decision to require plaintiff’s lawyers to certify the accuracy of facts and 
documents in residential foreclosure cases). 
 22 See, e.g., Bank of  N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. Nat’l v. Mihalca, No. 25747, 2012 WL 
473925, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2012) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the 
mortgagee when an affidavit in support of Rule 56 motion was not sufficiently made on 
basis of personal knowledge and the conclusory testimony from  mortgagee’s representative 
that mortgagee was the holder of the mortgage was insufficient to satisfy mortgagee’s initial 
burden under Rule 56). 
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party. Indeed such a practice forms the foundation on which most mortgage 
loans are originated and increases the funding available to issue additional 
mortgage loans.23 However, the applicable law determining both the standards 
for transfers, and the rights and obligations of the parties, remains unclear. Most 
notably, it is not clear whether a promissory note secured by a mortgage deed is 
a negotiable instrument, sufficient to trigger Article III of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC).24 The typical mortgage deed contains so many terms 
and conditions that the promissory note may not function as a negotiable 
instrument, which is described as a “courier without luggage.”25 Equally 
uncertain is whether Article IX of the UCC applies or whether state common 
law applies to such transfers.26 Finally, some states rely upon documents, such 
as collateral mortgage assignments, to determine whether the foreclosure 
plaintiff is the proper party to commence the foreclosure action, and may not 
stress the role of the UCC at all.27  
Precisely how these substantive issues play themselves out in the context of 
Rule 12 and 56 motions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, needless 
to say, the uncertain legal and factual landscape with respect to this single 
substantive issue is creating its fair share of litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The pronounced forms of ambivalence in judicial foreclosures may or may 
not result in a more coherent rationale for the degree to which judicial process is 
deemed necessary before a foreclosure sale can occur. Across the nation, the 
difference of opinion on the topic is wide. At the same time, the current 
situation with judicial foreclosures has created increasing complexity in and 
greater scrutiny of the judicial foreclosure process. What had long been a 
mechanical practice has become a fresh source of intriguing legal issues relating 
to the nature and purpose of a foreclosure action. 
 
                                                                                                                       
 23 Such mortgage loans include those made under the auspices of the Government 
Sponsored Entities (GSEs), such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Corporation (Freddie Mac), not to mention federal 
government agencies that directly back mortgages, such as the Fair Housing 
Administration’s division within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
 24 See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 951, 968–73 (1997). 
 25 Id. at 978. 
 26 See Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Professor, Capital Univ. Law Sch., Presentation at the 
Columbus Bar Association: Situation Overview—The Present State of the Law of 
Foreclosures (Sept. 30, 2011) (on file with author). 
 27 See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 801 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
